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Abstract
Different observers do not have to agree on how they identify a quantum
system. We explore a condition based on algorithmic complexity that
allows a system to be described as an objective “element of reality”. We
also suggest an experimental test of the hypothesis that any system, even
much smaller than a human being, can be a quantum mechanical observer.
1 Introduction
Quantum mechanical formalism has an orthodox interpretation that relies on
the cut between the observer and the system observed [4, 18]. This “shifty
split” [1] of the world into two parts cannot be removed: the formalism only
applies if the observer and the system are demarcated as two separate entities.
Standard quantum mechanics says nothing about the physical composition of
the observer, who is an abstract notion having no physical description from
within quantum theory. One cannot infer from the formalism if the observer
is a human being, a machine, a stone, a Martian, or the whole Universe. As
emphasized by Wheeler, this makes it extraordinarily difficult to state clearly
where “the community of observer-participators” begins and where it ends [19].
As a part of his relative-state interpretation, Everett argued that observers
are physical systems with memory, i.e., “parts... whose states are in corre-
spondence with past experience of the observers” [8]. We call this a universal
observer hypothesis: any system with certain information-theoretic properties
can serve as quantum mechanical observer, independently of its physical con-
stituency, size, presence or absence of conscious awareness and so forth. In this
vein, Rovelli claimed that observers are merely systems whose degrees of free-
dom are correlated with some property of the observed system: “Any system can
play the role of observed system and the role of observing system. . . . The fact
that observer O has information about system S (has measured S) is expressed
by the existence of a correlation. . . ” [17]. However, the universal observer hy-
pothesis has remained a controversial statement to this day. For example, Peres
claims in the way exactly opposite to Rovelli’s, that “the two electrons in the
ground state of the helium atom are correlated, but no one would say that each
electron ‘measures’ its partner” [16]. The purpose of this paper is to clarify an
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information-theoretic definition of quantum mechanical observer and to propose
a physical test of this hypothesis.
In section 2 we give a general definition of observer based on the intuitive
feeling that a key component of observation is system identification. Then
we apply to it the notion of Kolmogorov complexity, which is the main tool
of ensuing analysis. In section 3 this approach is developed to germinate a
definition of quantum and classical systems. In section 4 we consider a family
of observers and require that a system be identified by them in the same way,
thereby giving an information-theoretic criterion of an “element of reality”. In
section 5 we show that observers can be allowed some disagreement while still
maintaining an unambiguous identification of the observed element of reality.
Finally, in Section 6 we suggest an experimental test of the universal observer
hypothesis.
2 Observer as a system identification algorithm
What characterizes an observer is that it has information about some physical
system. This information fully or partially describes the state of the system. The
observer then measures the system, obtains further information and updates his
description accordingly. Physical processes listed here: the measurement, up-
dating of the information, ascribing a state, happen in many ways depending
on the physical constituency of the observer. The memory of a computer acting
as an observer, for instance, is not the same as human memory, and measure-
ment devices vary in their design and functioning. Still one feature unites all
observers: that whatever they do, they do it to a system. In quantum me-
chanics, defining an observer goes hand in hand with defining a system under
observation. An observer without a system is a meaningless nametag, a system
without an observer who measures it is a mathematical abstraction. What re-
mains constant throughout measurement is the identification, by the observer,
of the quantum system.
Quantum systems aren’t like sweets: they don’t melt. Take a general ther-
modynamic system interacting with other systems. Such a system can dissipate,
diffuse, or dissolve, and thus stop being a system. If at first a cube of ice gur-
gling into tepid water is definitely a thermodynamic system, it makes no sense
to speak about it being a system after it has dissolved. Quantum systems aren’t
like this. Its state may evolve, but the observer knows how to tell the system
he observes from the rest or the environment. An electron in a certain spin
state remains an electron after measurement, i.e., it remains a system with a
particular set of the degrees of freedom. The observer maintains the identity
of the system notwithstanding a change in the state of this system that may
or may not occur. So, whatever else he might happen to be, the observer is
primarily a system identification machine. Different observers having different
features (clock hands, eyes, optical memory devices, internal cavities, etc.) all
share this central characteristic.
Definition 2.1. An observer is a system identification algorithm (SIA).
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Particular observers can be made of flesh or, perhaps, of silicon. ‘Hardware’
and ‘low-level programming’ are different for such observers, yet they all perform
the task of system identification. This task can be defined as an algorithm on a
universal computer, e.g., the Turing machine: take a tape containing the list of
all degrees of freedom, send a Turing machine along this tape so that it puts a
mark against the degrees of freedom that belong to the quantum system under
consideration. Any concrete SIA may proceed in a very different manner, yet
all can be modelled with the help of this abstract construction.
The SIAs whose physical realization may differ share one property that does
not depend on the hardware: their algorithmic, or Kolmogorov, complexity. Any
SIA can be reconstructed from a binary string of some minimal length (which is
a function of this SIA) by a universal machine. As shown by Kolmogorov [14],
this minimal compression length defines the amount of information in the SIA
and does not depend (up to a constant) on the realization of the SIA on this or
that hardware. The common-lore view of a multitude of individual observers,
one hastily printing, another yawning, a third one moving around his DNA
strands, is now superseded by the view of different SIAs, each with its algorith-
mic complexity defined via a universal machine.
3 Quantum and classical systems
Each quantum systems has a certain number of the degrees of freedom, which
we think about as being independent parameters needed in order to characterize
the state of the system. For example, a system with only two states (spin-up and
spin-down) has one degree of freedom and can be described by one parameter
σ = ±1. If we write down these parameters as a binary string, the Kolmogorov
complexity of that string is at least the number of the degrees of freedom of
the system. Consequently, for any system S, the Kolmogorov complexity of the
binary string s representing its parameters
K(s) ≥ dS , (1)
where dS is the number of the degrees of freedom in S. In what follows the
notation K(s) and K(S) will be used interchangeably.
When we say that an observer X observes a quantum system S, it is usually
the case that K(S)  K(X). In this case the observer will have no trouble
keeping track of all the degrees of freedom of the system; in other words, the
system will not ‘dissolve’ or ‘melt’ in the course of dynamics. However, it is also
possible that X identifies a system with K(S) > K(X). For such an observer,
the identity of system S cannot be maintained and some degrees of freedom will
fall out from the description that X makes of S.
Definition 3.1. System S is called quantum with respect to observer X if
K(S) < K(X), meaning that X can give a complete description of all its degrees
of freedom. Otherwise S is called classical with respect to X.
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Suppose that X observes a quantum system S and another observer Y ob-
serves both S and X. If K(Y ) is greater than both K(X) and K(S), observer
Y will identify both systems as quantum systems. In this case Y will typ-
ically treat the interaction between X and S as an interaction between two
quantum systems. If, however, K(X) and K(Y ) are close, K(X)  K(S) and
K(Y )  K(S) but K(X) ' K(Y ), then Y will see S as a quantum system
but the other observer, X, as a classical system. An interaction with a classical
system, which we usually call ‘observation’, is a process of decoherence that
occurs when the Kolmogorov complexity of at least one of the systems involved
approaches the Kolmogorov complexity of the external observer. In this case
Y cannot maintain a complete description of X interacting with S and must
discard some of the degrees of freedom. If we assume that all human observers
acting in their SIA capacity have approximately the same Kolmogorov complex-
ity, this situation may provide an explanation of the fact that we never see a
human observer (or, say, a cat) as a quantum system.
One welcome consequence of Definition 2.1 is that Kolmogorov complexity
K(X) is not computable. We as human observers do not seem to know the
maximum number of the degrees of freedom in a system that we can still keep
track of. A photon is certainly a quantum system from our point of view, a
simple atom too, a C60 perhaps as well, albeit seeing quantum effects with
fullerenes is not easy. But we have never seen a quantum system having, say,
1023 degrees of freedom. So where does the border run? Is it a number like 6 or
20 or is it 10n, n > 2? All we can say is that mathematics shows that human
observers cannot compute their own K(X).
4 Elements of reality
Ever since the EPR paper [5], the question of what is real in the quantum world
has been at the forefront of all conceptual discussions about quantum theory.
Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen formulated their question with regard to physical
properties: e.g., is position or momentum real? This is however not the only
problem of reality that appears when many observers enter the game. Imagine a
sequence of observers Xi, i = 1, 2, . . ., each identifying systems Sn, n = 1, 2, . . ..
System identifications of each Sn do not have to coincide as some observers
may have their Kolmogorov complexity K(Xi) below, or close to, K(Sn), and
others much bigger than K(Sn). If there is disagreement, is it possible to say
that the systems are real, or objects of quantum mechanical investigation, in
some sense? We can encode the binary identification string produced by each
observer in his SIA capacity as some random variable ξi ∈ Ω, where Ω is the
space of such binary identification strings, possibly of infinite length. Index i
is the number of the observer, and the values taken by random variable ξi bear
index n corresponding to “i-th observer having identified system Sn”. Adding
more observers, and in the limit i → ∞ infinitely many observers, provides us
with additional identification strings. Putting them together gives a stochastic
process {ξi}, which is an observation process by many observers. If systems Sn
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are to have a meaning as “elements of reality”, it is reasonable to require that
this stochastic process have entropy rate equal to zero:
H({ξi}) = 0. (2)
We also consider this process stationary and ergodic.
Let us illustrate the significance of condition (2) on a simplified example.
Suppose that θ1, θ2, . . . is a sequence of independent identically distributed ran-
dom variables taking their values among binary strings of length r with prob-
abilities qk, k ≤ 2r. These θk can be seen as identifications, by different SIAs,
of different physical systems, i.e., a special case of the ξi-type sequences having
fixed length and identical distributions. For instance, we may imagine that θ1
is a binary encoding of the first observer seeing an electron and θ2 is a binary
string corresponding to the second observer having identified a physical system
such as an elephant; and so forth. Entropy becomes simply:
H = −
∑
k
qk log qk. (3)
Condition (2) applied to entropy (3) means that all observers output one and
the same identification string of length r, i.e., all SIAs are identical. This
deterministic system identification, of course, obtains only under the assumption
that the string length is fixed for all observers and their random variables are
identically distributed, both of which are not plausible in the case of actual
quantum mechanical observers. So rather than requiring identical strings we
impose condition (2) as a criterion of the system being identified in the same
way by all observers, i.e., it becomes a candidate quantum mechanical “object
of investigation”.
5 Relativity of observation
Let us explore the consequences of condition (2). Define a binary sequence αin as
a concatenation of the system identifications strings of systems Sn by different
observers:
αin = (ξ1)n (ξ2)n . . . (ξi)n, (4)
where index i numbers observers and the upper bar corresponds to “string
concatenation” (a detailed definition can be found in [24]). Of course, this
concatenation is only a logical operation and not a physical process. A theo-
rem by Brudno [2, 3] conjectured by Zvonkin and Levin [24] affirms that the
Kolmogorov complexities of strings αin converge towards entropy:
lim
n→∞ limi→∞
K(αin)
i
= H({ξi}). (5)
For a fixed i and the observer Xi who observes systems Sn that are quantum in
the sense of Definition 3.1, variation of K(αin) in n is bounded by the observer’s
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own complexity in his SIA capacity:
K(αin) < K(Xi) ∀n, i fixed. (6)
Hence eqs. (2) and (5) require that
lim
i→∞
K(αin)
i
= 0. (7)
This entails that the growth of K(αin) in i cannot be faster than logarithmical.
Therefore the following:
Proposition 5.1. An element of reality that may become an object of quantum
mechanical investigation can be defined only with respect to a class of not very
different observers.
To give an intuitive illustration, imagine adding a new observer Xi+1 to a
group of observers X1, . . . , Xi who identify systems Sn. This adds a new identi-
fication string that we glue at the end of concatenated string αin consisting of all
Xi’s identifications of Sn, thus obtaining a new string α
i+1
n . The Kolmogorov
complexity of αi+1n does not have to be the same as the Kolmogorov complex-
ity of αin; it can grow, but not too fast, i.e., not faster than the logarithm.
Adding a new observation may effectively add some new non-compressible bits,
but not too many such bits. If this is so, then H = 0 still obtains. Although
observers X1, . . . , Xi, Xi+1 produce slightly different identification strings, they
agree, simply speaking, that an atom is an atom and not something that looks
more like an elephant.
The above reasoning applies only to quantum systems Sn in the sense of
Definition 3.1. This is because in the case of classical systems different ob-
servers may each operate their own coarse-graining, keeping only some degrees
of freedom. System identification strings may then differ dramatically and one
cannot expect K(αin) to grow moderately.
6 Experimental test
A previously suggested experimental connection between thermodynamics and
theories based on Kolmogorov complexity is based on observing the conse-
quences of a change in the system’s state [22, 21, 23, 7]. Zurek introduced
the notion of physical entropy S = H +K, where H is the thermodynamic en-
tropy and K the Kolmogorov entropy. If the observer with a finite memory has
to record the changing states of the quantum system, then there will be a change
in S, like the one depicted on Figure 1, and it will lead to heat production that
can be observed experimentally.
What we propose here, based on a suggestion by Anton Zeilinger, is a simpler
setting that can still serve as a test of the universal observer hypothesis. It does
not rely on the measurement of particular states, but on the fact of measurement
6
Figure 1: Experiment leading to heat production when physical entropy S =
H +K changes.
Figure 2: Experiment leading to heat production when observer’s memory be-
comes saturated.
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as such. If a measurement occurs, then the observer has identified the quantum
system, and this fact in itself, if repeated, will eventually lead to heat production.
An individual fullerene molecule is placed in a highly sensitive calorimeter
and bombarded with photons, which play the role of quantum systems with low
K(S) (Figure 2). According to the universal observer hypothesis, the fullerene
is a quantum mechanical observer with K(X) > K(S). Thus the absorption
of the photon by the fullerene can be described as measurement: the fullerene
identifies a quantum system, i.e. the photon, and observes it, obtaining new
information. Physically, this process amounts to establishing a correlation be-
tween the photon variables, i.e., its energy, and the degrees of freedom of the
fullerene. The external observer knows that such a process has occurred but
remains unaware of its exact content, so that he is aware that there has been
measurement, but doesn’t know a precise state of the photon as measured by
the fullerene, nor a precise state of the fullerene after measurement.
Informationally speaking, the same process can be described at storing in-
formation in the fullerene’s memory. If measurement is repeated on several pho-
tons, more such information is stored, so that at some point total Kolmogorov
complexity will approach K(X). When it reaches K(X), the fullerene will stop
identifying incoming photons as quantum systems. Any further physical pro-
cess will lead to heat production due to the erasure of memory, as prescribed by
the Landauer principle. Physically, this process will correspond to a change of
state of the carbon atoms that make up the fullerene molecule: the calorimeter
will register a sudden increase in heat when C60 cannot store more information,
thereby ending its observer function.
Actual experiments with fullerenes show that this scenario is realistic. A
fullerene molecule “contains so many degrees of freedom that conversion of
electronic excitation to vibrational excitation is extremely rapid”. Thus, the
fullerene is a good candidate for a quantum mechanical observer, for “the
molecule can store large amounts of excitation for extended periods of time be-
fore degradation of the molecule (ionization or fragmentation) is observed” [15].
The experiments in which fullerenes are bombarded with photons demonstrate
that “the energy of the electronic excitation as a result of absorption of a laser
photon by a molecule is rapidly converted into the energy of molecular vibra-
tions, which becomes distributed in a statistical manner between a large number
of the degrees of freedom of the molecule. . . The fullerene may absorb up to 10
photons at λ = 308 nm wavelength before the dissociation of the molecule into
smaller carbon compounds” [6]. We read these results as a suggestion that there
should be one order of magnitude difference between K(S) and K(X) and that
this allows the fullerene to act as quantum mechanical observer for up to 10
photons at 308 nm wavelength. What needs to be tested experimentally in this
setting is heat production: we conjecture that if the same process occurs inside
a calorimeter, the latter will register a sudden increase in heat after the fullerene
will have observed 10 photons. What we predict here isn’t new physics, but an
explanation on a new level: that of information, of a physical process: heat
production, whose role during the dissociation of fullerenes has been largely
overlooked. We suggest that heat production deserves special attention as a
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signature of the fullerene’s role as quantum mechanical observer.
As a side remark, imagine that the photon’s polarization state in some basis
were fully mixed:
1
2
(|0〉+ |1〉).
While only the energy of the photon matters during absorption, the external
observer records von Neumann entropy H = log 2 corresponding to this mixture
(the initial state of the fullerene is assumed fully known). After absorption, it
is mandatory that this entropy be converted into Shannon entropy of the new
fullerene state, corresponding nicely to the uncertainty of the external observer
in describing the “statistical manner” of the distribution over a large number
of the degrees of freedom. From the internal point of view, we may assume
perfect ‘self-knowledge’ of the observer, which puts his Shannon entropy equal
to zero. However, his Kolmogorov entropy will increase as a result of recording
the measurement information [21]. Heat produced during the erasure of mea-
surement information is at least equal to Kolmogorov complexity of the string
that was stored in observer’s memory; but according to quantum mechanics,
this heat will not reveal to the external observer any information about the
precise photon state observed by the fullerene.
7 Conclusion
The Copenhagen view of quantum mechanics traditionally described quantum
systems and observers, epistemologically, as belonging to different categories.
On the contrary, the view based on the relativity of observation, as proposed
by Everett and later Rovelli, puts all systems on equal grounds and ascribes
them only relative states. These two views are not as contradictory as they
may seem. Relativity of observation has been understood by some proponents
of the Copenhagen school [12, 9, 10]. Information-theoretic treatment of the
observer gives a chance to completely overcome the tension. On the one hand,
the observer is a SIA and is characterized by its Kolmogorov complexity. On
the other hand, quantum mechanics can be reconstructed from information-
theoretic axioms and thus seen as a theory of information [11]. This puts all
systems on equal grounds, in the spirit of Rovelli, while emphasizing the idea
of relativity of observation, in the spirit of Fock.
Additionally, information-theoretic treatment of the observer provides a some-
what surprising result developing EPR’s notion of “element of reality”. One can
make sense of a system existing independently of observation, with respect to
a class of observers whose Kolmogorov complexities may differ, even if slightly.
Equation (7) provides a mathematical criterion for this.
We have analyzed the observer as a system identification algorithm in the
context of quantum mechanics. It remains an open question to apply this anal-
ysis to quantum field theory, where the task of system identification may look
significantly different from the finite-dimensional situation. It also remains an
open problem to realize experimentally the setup proposed in Section 6, which
9
may lead to experimental confirmation of the universal observer hypothesis.
Putting together this experimental test, which may show that a fullerene can
act as a observer for up to 10 photons, and the remark on non-computability
of K(X) at the end of Section 3 begs yet another question: is it possible to
say that, although K(X) isn’t computable in the mathematical sense, physical
experiment effectively computes it?
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